During the pandemic, I became increasingly uncomfortable with parts of the commercial real estate market. I remember thinking, “I don't think I want to be an owner of real estate, but I might want to be a lender to it.”
I didn't predict everything that would happen to office buildings and other commercial properties. But I could see reasons to be more cautious about ownership while becoming more interested in the credit behind those properties.
My background is in fixed income, and I've always believed that if a problem is developing in the capital markets, you're likely to see it in the credit markets first. The 2008 financial crisis is an obvious example. The dislocation began in housing and credit before its full consequences played out in the stock market.
That perspective has influenced how we've approached private credit for years. And as conditions have changed, so has our thinking about where the more attractive opportunities may be.
That rethinking feels especially relevant now. Recent borrower troubles and restrictions on withdrawals from some private credit funds have brought new attention to the risks involved. They're also reinforcing the importance of understanding what's behind the loans and how these investments are structured.
When interest rates were extremely low, private credit offered a meaningful yield premium over Treasuries and other traditional fixed income investments.
Many of these loans also carried floating interest rates. That was appealing when rates had been declining for years and there didn't seem to be much room left for them to fall.
We began building exposure across different credit strategies, including collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), and gradually expanded our private credit investments as the market developed.
But there's another side to floating-rate lending.
The higher interest payments that benefit a lender can put considerable pressure on the borrower.
A company that could comfortably service its debt when rates were low may have a much harder time doing so several years later. Add slowing revenue or declining property values, and a loan that originally looked attractive can become a very different proposition.
The refinancing problem
Commercial real estate offers a good example of how these pressures come together.
Here's a simplified, hypothetical example. Let's say you bought an apartment building worth $1 million and financed it with a $600,000 loan. That's a 60% loan-to-value ratio.
Now imagine the building's value has declined to $800,000. If the lender is still willing to finance only 60% of its value, the new loan would be $480,000.
You have a $600,000 loan coming due, but you can only refinance $480,000. Somehow, you need to come up with another $120,000.
And that's before considering the higher interest payments on the new loan. Higher borrowing costs can also weigh on property valuations, so the two problems often arrive together.
The building might still be performing reasonably well. It may have good tenants and decent cash flow. But if comparable properties in the area have fallen in value, your building can get painted with the same broad brush.
Anyone who's bought or sold a home understands how much comparable sales influence valuations. Commercial real estate works much the same way, although the income a property produces is also a major consideration.
Now the owner may need to contribute more capital to refinance, while the higher debt payments reduce the cash available to distribute to investors.
Some lenders have extended existing loans rather than forcing borrowers to refinance under difficult conditions. The hope was that rates would decline, property values would recover, or both.
Those extensions buy time. They don't necessarily solve the underlying problem.
This is also where my original instinct needs a caveat. Being a lender rather than an owner puts you higher in the capital structure, but it doesn't make you immune. When a borrower can't refinance, the lender has a problem too. That's why the quality of the underlying loan, the collateral behind it, and the borrower's ability to repay have become even more important in evaluating these opportunities.
With a substantial volume of commercial real estate loans facing refinancing over the next several years, I expect these pressures to continue creating difficult decisions for borrowers and lenders.
And I think they'll create opportunities for investors who understand the underlying assets and have the capital to act.
When someone needs to sell
A property can be worth owning over the long term while its current owner faces a serious problem with the debt.
A lender may want to reduce exposure. An investor may need liquidity. And when someone needs to sell, the price they're willing to accept can change considerably.
Of course, you still need to know what you're buying. Some loans may be available at a discount because their owners need liquidity. Others may be available at a discount because the borrower is in trouble.
Telling the two apart is where the manager earns their keep.
We're particularly interested in opportunities developing in the secondary market for private credit. Existing loans and fund interests can change hands for different reasons. When evaluating a potential purchase, the question is why it's being sold and at what price.
Think about a fund that was established with an expected life of seven or ten years. As it approaches the end of that period, investors expect to receive their capital back.
What happens if the fund still owns loans that haven't been repaid?
The manager may be able to extend the fund's life. But if investors want their money back, the fund may need to sell existing positions to create liquidity.
Now the buyer with available cash is in a very different position.
The seller's need for liquidity may influence the price, even when the underlying loan remains fundamentally sound. That creates an opportunity for someone with the capital, patience, and expertise to evaluate those loans.
Historically, the secondary market for private credit was thin. That's changing. More funds are reaching the point where they need to return capital, and I'm interested in what that means for buyers of existing debt.
Where I'm more cautious
At the same time, there are areas of private credit that concern me.
One is lending associated with private equity transactions, particularly where companies have taken on significant debt and are finding it harder to make their payments.
We have some exposure to that part of the market, but I don't find certain areas of it especially attractive right now.
Software is one sector I'm watching closely. It has been a significant area of private credit lending, in part because lenders were comfortable with the predictable, recurring revenue many software companies generate. Artificial intelligence could change those economics for some businesses. If a company's product becomes easier to replicate or its pricing power erodes, that recurring revenue may be less dependable than the original loan assumed. I'd want to know how much of a private credit portfolio is exposed to companies whose business models may be affected.
Another issue is the use of pay-in-kind interest, commonly called PIK.
Instead of paying interest in cash, a borrower can add the amount owed to its outstanding debt. Depending on how the loan is structured, that can be a legitimate financing feature.
What concerns me is when a borrower that was supposed to make cash payments can no longer do so and needs to defer the obligation.
My question is pretty straightforward: If you can't pay me now, why are you going to be able to pay me later?
There may be a perfectly reasonable answer. Perhaps the company has a temporary cash flow issue and a credible path to recovery.
But I want to understand whether we're dealing with a temporary problem or allowing a larger one to develop.
You're essentially accepting an IOU for interest that was supposed to be paid today. The balance keeps growing, but the borrower's ability to repay may not.
What I'd want to know as an investor today
If you already own private credit, I think there are several questions worth asking that may not have seemed as urgent a few years ago.
First, where is the money actually invested?
A fund can own a large number of loans and still have significant exposure to a particular industry or type of borrower. I'd want to see those concentrations, particularly in sectors facing changes to their underlying economics.
Second, how much of the portfolio's interest is being paid in cash, and how much is being added to borrowers' outstanding debt?
If PIK exposure has increased, why? Was it part of the original loan structure, or did the terms change because borrowers were having difficulty making payments?
Third, how easily can you get your money out?
Some semi-liquid private credit funds offer periodic redemption opportunities, usually subject to limits on how much can be redeemed at once. That's worth understanding before you need it, not after. What happens if many investors ask for their money back at the same time?
Fourth, how are the loans being valued?
Private loans don't trade on an exchange, so their values are estimates. I'd want to know who's doing the valuing, how often, and whether the marks have kept pace with what's happening to the borrowers.
And perhaps most important, who's managing the money?
I'd want managers with demonstrated experience working through difficult credit cycles. People who have dealt with problem loans, restructurings, and situations where their original assumptions didn't hold up.
It's one thing to generate attractive returns when credit conditions are favorable. I want to know how a manager has performed when borrowers run into trouble.
I continue to see opportunities in private credit. Some of the areas that interest me most today are developing precisely because other investors and borrowers are under pressure.
But I'm more selective about where that capital goes.
I want to understand what we're buying, why it's available at that price, and who's making the decisions when things don't go according to plan.